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STOP THE MONEY, STOP THE ATTACKS:
A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING AN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCING
SANCTION REGIME
Vietlong Nguyen *
Money allows terrorist organizations to continue their day-to-day operations.
Stopping the flow of financial support to terrorist organizations will diminish the
intensity and frequency of the attacks and ideally lead to a cessation of such
attacks. One country may be able to establish barriers to terrorist financing
through government sanctions. These barriers will not stop terrorist financing; but
rather, it will divert it to another country. The only way to effectively stop such
financing is to implement international standards for terrorist financing sanctions.
But as countries differ economically and politically, a solution must accommodate
each countries’ unique situation. This comment analyzes the approaches of the
United States, Tanzania, and Macau, showing the gaping differences that exist
within the international community. By applying the “Willingness to Buy”
Theory, this comment offers a solution which coordinates and maximizes
participants in the international terrorist financing sanctions regime.
INTRODUCTION
Behind every terrorist attack, there are financiers. 1 As money flows into
these organizations, the threat of terrorism persists. 2 Cutting off the financial

Vietlong Nguyen, J.D. candidate 2012, Penn State University Dickinson School of
Law. First, I would like to thank Professor John E. Lopatka for his insight, knowledge, and
guidance. I would also like to thank Thomas Caldwell for his feedback and tremendous
patience. Lastly, to my friends and family, I am eternally grateful for your unending support.
1 See, e.g., NAT. COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 108-09 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. Osama Bin Laden funded the training of
Egyptian terrorists in Sudan, as well as Yemeni terrorists in their 1992 attempt to kill U.S. troops in
Yemen. Id. at 169 (“The 9/11 plotters . . . spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan
and conduct their attack.”); but see also Section III.A. infra p. 19 (The validity of the statement;
however, may depend upon which definition of “terrorism” is applied.).
2 See Section I.A. infra p. 4.
*
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resources for terrorists will drastically alter the landscape of the battlefield.3 Terrorist
financing sanctions serve a practical and desirable purpose – diminishing the
effectiveness of terrorist organizations – but the implementation and enforcement of
these measures are flawed. 4 Throughout the international community, there is
asymmetric treatment of this issue. While the United States is at the forefront,5 there
are other States who are either unable6 or unwilling7 to follow suit. Once the world
effectively partakes in this initiative, terrorist financing sanctions will provide a
strong deterrent against acts of terrorism and will enhance international security.8
Terrorist threats to international security stem from a wide array of attacks,
schemes, and ploys. These are premeditated acts of violence perpetrated against
noncombatants in furtherance of a political goal.9 It may be a suicide bomber on a
crowded street, a coordinated bombing of an embassy, or the kidnapping of select
high-profile individuals; the possibilities are endless and the impact is highly
effective. In order to preserve international security, there must be an international
effort against terrorism.10
One possible course of action is to take on the terrorists directly by foiling
the masterminds before their planned attack comes to fruition. This plan, however,
would only be a short-term solution to a long-term problem. The problem lies in the
terrorist organization’s “ability to regroup and replenish the loss of its physical
infrastructure and its leadership.”11 Despite having only immediate impact with no

Hillel Frisch, Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas, 32 STUD. IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1049, 1051-1052 (2009) (If terrorist organizations lose their financial
network, they will have to turn to other less expensive means to carry out their attacks.).
4 This comment will show that terrorist financing sanctions make a difference when the
international community participates as a whole. The problem is the lack of an effective approach
towards the creation and implementation of these sanctions in non-participating countries. See, e.g.,
Financing Terrorism: Looking in the Wrong Places, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 63.
5 See Section I.B.2. infra p. 8.
6 See Section I.B.4. infra p. 11.
7 See Section I.B.3. infra p. 19.
8 See Conclusion Section IV infra p. 24.
9 There is no internationally accepted definition for “terrorism.”
The U.S. alone has
multiple definitions for this phenomenon. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (2001) (“violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life . . . intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”); 22 U.S.C. § 2656F(d)(2) (2004) (U.S. Department of State:
“‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”); Dep’t of Def., Dep’t of Def. Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms 368 (Joint Publication 1-02 2010), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (“The calculated use of unlawful violence or
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”); but see There is no
UN definition of terrorism, EYE ON THE UN, http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1&p=61 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012) (The U.N. has not defined the term “terrorism.”).
10 See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (Terrorist financiers will alter their operations in
order to exploit or bypass standing sanctions.).
11 Rohan Gunaratna & Aviv Oreg, Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution, 33
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1043, 1044 (2010).
3
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residual effects, these direct encounters remain vitally important to provide relief to
innocent bystanders.12
The other, more favorable, option is to eliminate the financial source; the
very source that empowers these terrorist organizations with the monetary means to
conduct their operations. This would provide a long-term solution to a recurring
international issue. 13 These financial measures have been implemented, but not
uniformly throughout the world.14 Though the expected positive consequences are
tempting, this outcome can only be achieved through full international cooperation. 15
Anything short of full collaboration will provide terrorists with the opportunity to
exploit the deficient terrorist financing measures.16 This comment advocates that the
solution to international terrorism is international cooperation to regulate terrorist
financing.
Section I will provide a brief overview of current terrorist financing sanctions
and the international efforts accompanying those sanctions.17 Section II introduces
the “willingness to buy” theory. This section will explain how an individual’s
behavior may be applied to international states in conjunction with terrorist
financing sanctions.18 Also, this section describes the four categories into which a
state may fall based on their ability and willingness to implement terrorist financing
sanctions. Section III seeks to resolve the terrorist financing problem with a
reasonable, yet novel, solution which the international community may adopt.19 This
solution would respond to and combat the continuing threats of terrorism by
maximizing the participants in terrorist financing sanctions.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Nothing is free. There is a cost associated with everything, including terrorist
attacks. With effective terrorist financing sanctions, the frequency of terrorist attacks
will be reduced. Countries, however, are in different predicaments. Some lack the
financial resources to follow through on these sanctions; whereas others choose to
refrain from participating. By understanding the important circumstances that afflict
a given country, an effective solution can be developed and implemented.

See Section I.A. infra p. 4. By reducing the amount of money in the hands of terrorists,
they will be unable to afford weapons and explosive devices. Therefore, frequency of attacks against
innocent bystanders will decrease.
13 See Section III infra p. 19.
14 Compare United States Section I.B.2. infra p. 8 with Macau Section I.B.3. infra p. 91 and
Tanzania Section I.B.4. infra p. 11.
15 See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”).
16 See id.
17 See Section I. infra p. 3.
18 See Section II. infra p. 13.
19 See Section III. infra p. 19.
12
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A. Why International Terrorist Financing Sanctions Are Necessary
The first step is to understand the underlying goal that these terrorism
financing measures hope to achieve. In addition to troops on the ground, another
way to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring is to cut off their financial
resources. 20 With the means to sever terrorist organizations from their supply of
munitions, logistical support, or compensation, terrorist activities will come to a
halt.21
Terrorist organizations derive their financial support from illegal activities,22
networks of financial supporters,23 and charitable organizations.24 With the effective
implementation of terrorist financing sanctions, these terrorist organizations will lose
their financial resources. This strategy, in turn, will force terrorists to utilize less
devastating substitutes.25 Terrorist attacks will, therefore, become less potent.26 The
beauty of terrorist financing sanctions, at least in the U.S., is that the government
does not need to show that there was a specific intent by the financier to support,
directly or indirectly, terrorist organizations.27 Regardless of whom the financier is
and to whom the money is sent, if the funds are determined to have reached or will

President George W. Bush, President Freezes Terrorists’ Assets (Sep. 24, 2001) (“We will
starve terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places,
and
bring
them
to
justice.”),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html (hereinafter “President Bush’s
Speech.”).
21 Frisch, supra note 3, at 1051–1052 (By imposing greater economic costs on current
terrorist operations, “perpetrator of organized violence will substitute new techniques of violence to
replace or complement those that are no longer efficient.”).
22 Mark Basile, Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the
Current War on Terrorist Financing, 27 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 169, 172 (2004) (“One such
business is the diamond business, which Al Qaeda runs in Liberia and Burkina Faso, two countries
involved in the illicit diamond trade. Al Qaeda diamond trafficking, which has gone undisturbed since
1998 when it was established in the $20 million industry in West Africa, represents an illegitimate
business that Al Qaeda has significantly profited from by working with a number of local
companies.”); see also Hezbollah around the World, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Mar. 31, 2008),
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_5
(Diamond smuggling and money laundering are some sources of illegal financial support.).
23
State Sponsors: Iran and Syria, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Mar. 31, 2008),
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_6
(“Quds force provides Hezbollah with $100-$200 million in funding every year . . .”; “In 2008 alone,
Iran provided more than $200 million in funding to Lebanon and trained more than 3,000 Hezbollah
fighters, according to the State Department.”).
24 Basile, supra note 22, at 171; and Hezbollah around the World, supra note 22.
25 See Frisch, supra note 3, at 1052 (The Palestinians had to change their strategy. “As suicide
bombings became more difficult, Palestinian ballistic and mortar activity significantly increased.”).
26 See id. at 1054 (Suicide attacks were the main cause of Israeli fatalities. By forcing the
Palestinians to change their tactic away from suicide bombing, they were able to carry out more
attacks, but with less efficiency.).
27 See Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001) (It is a violation of this order for a
person to “to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or
financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed . . . or
determined to be subject to this order.” There is no requirement that the government must show that
the person committed the listed acts with the intention of actually supporting terrorist organizations.).
20
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soon reach terrorist organizations, then those assets may be frozen.28 By depriving
terrorist organizations of financial resources, the incentive to engage in these terrorist
activities will decrease.29
The financial status of these organizations is well-rooted in deep pockets
with abundant resources. The al-Qaeda terrorist network is “approximated at over
$300 million in value,” 30 dispersing between $30 and $40 million per year. 31
Hezbollah, on the other hand, has been estimated to maintain an operational budget
of approximately $200-$500 million annually.32 In addition to criminal activity, other
countries provide direct financial support to these organizations. For example, “the
Iranian regime operates as the central banker of terrorism, spending hundreds of
millions of dollars each year to fund terrorism.”33
The other source of terrorist funds comes from charitable contributions.
Due to the fact that one of five principle pillars of the Islamic religion relates to
charitable contributions, terrorist organizations have been able to take advantage of
this tenet.34 Monitoring these charities and its disbursement is integral to the success
of terrorist financing sanctions.
Funds would be allocated, and accounted for, by the
charity for community development and charitable
activities. Once the full amount was pulled out for the
charitable project, a small percentage (around 10%) of
the cash was skimmed off the top and physically
passed to [terrorist] operative who deposited this clean
money into [terrorist] accounts.35

Id.
Frisch, supra note 3, at 1051–1052. With less financial resources available, the incentive
for costly attacks greatly decreases as terrorist organizations are required to seek out alternative
measures which may be ineffective substitutions.
30 Basile, supra note 22, at 170.
31 R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND THE
UNDERWORLD ECONOMY 288 (rev. ed. 2004).
32
Hezbollah’s International Reach, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Dec. 7, 2004),
http://www.adl.org/terror/hezbollah_print.asp.
33 Between Feckless and Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: Joint Hearing Before
Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 27 (2008) (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec’y
for Terrorist Fin. & Fin. Crimes).
34 See, e.g., MILLIARD BURR & ROBERT O. COLLINS, ALMS FOR JIHAD 11–25 (2006); THOMAS
J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 9 (2008) (Zakat is
“the Islamic concept of tithing and alms obliging Muslims to contribute to charitable causes.”); 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (“Some individual donors surely knew, and other did not,
the ultimate destination of their donations. Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam’s strong
calls for charitable giving, zakat.”).
35 Basile, supra note 22, at 173.
28
29
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It is estimated that “it cost al-Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities
before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations.”36 Due to
lax regulations, donations may be moved to terrorist organizations unbeknownst to
the donor.37
Though it is plain to see that charitable donations pose a significant problem
to the War on Terror internationally,38 there are problems with addressing this issue.
The first is that many Muslim charities do provide genuine humanitarian assistance
and services, 39 so most of these charitable contributions do not arouse suspicion
from the authorities.40 Also, because these charities may provide assistance to the
community, “shutting them down may create serious problems for local beneficiaries
and have negative impacts on humanitarian needs.”41 Lastly, illegitimate charities will
continue to accept donations when the semi-legitimate charities are
decommissioned.42
With abundant resources available at their disposal, these terrorist
organizations are able to operate within a spectrum limited only by their creativity. 43
Shockingly, “[a]s today’s weapons of mass destruction go, the human bomb is
cheap.”44 It costs about $150 to execute a suicide bombing mission. 45 “[A]part from
a willing young man [or woman], all that is needed is such items as nails, gunpowder,
a battery, a light switch and a short cable, mercury . . . , acetone, and the cost of
tailoring a belt wide enough to hold six to eight pockets of explosives.” 46 More
expensive than these parts is the transportation to the targeted town.47 The most
expensive part of a suicide bombing, however, is the payments to the family of the
suicide bomber.48
36 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (citing C.I.A. ANALYTIC REPORT,
TERRORISM: AMOUNT OF MONEY IT TAKES TO KEEP AL-QA'IDA FUNCTIONING (2002), and C.I.A.
ANALYTIC REPORT, TERRORISM: AL-QA'IDA OPERATING ON A SHOESTRING (undated post-9/11))
(emphasis added).
37 See Basile, supra note 22, at 173-74.
38 See id.
39 See Martin Rudner, Hizbollah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering, 33 STUD.
IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 700, 703 (2010).
40 See Money Laundering and Terror Fin. Issues in the Middle East: Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under
Sec’y Office of Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/js2427.aspx.
41 Basile, supra note 22, at 173.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Female Suicide Bomber Identified, AL-BAWABA NEWS, Jan. 28, 2002 (“This was the
first suicide attack carried out by a Palestinian woman.”); Hala Jaber, The Avengers, SUNDAY TIMES
(LONDON), Dec. 7, 2003 (The use of women is a way around security complications.).
44 See Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the “Human Bombs”, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov. 19, 2001.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48
See, e.g., id.; Palestinians get Saddam Funds, BBC NEWS, Mar. 13, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm (Saddam paid $25,000 to the family of a
suicide bomber but only $10,000 to those who died in combat; Hizbollah increases pay for suicide
attacks from $20,000 to $100,000 after Israel returns terrorists bodies in "goodwill gesture");
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The overarching theme of the terrorist finance sanctions is to “starve
terrorists of funding . . . and bring them to justice.”49 “Money is the lifeblood of
terrorist operations.”50 Without the financial ability to supply the organization, the
incentive for suicide bombers and terrorists drop. Thus, not only are the lives of
U.S. and international troops spared, but also those of innocent civilians.
B. Current Terrorist Financing Sanctions
Each sovereign country can choose to handle its affairs as it sees fit. But,
when it comes to terrorist financing, the relevant United Nations resolution
mandates that its member nations pursue a common goal – implement terrorist
financing sanctions. Countries (U.S., Macau, and Tanzania), however, have
responded to this mandate with differing levels of ambition.
1.

U.N. Terrorist Financing Resolutions

In 1999, the U.N. Security Council created the 1267 Committee which had
the power to freeze financial assets of individuals and entities associated with AlQaida, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban.51 These entities were then placed on a
consolidated list.52 The scope was then broadened in 2001 to include all individuals
who finance acts of terrorism.53
Even with very little proof of terrorist financing activity, the controversial
listing procedure allowed the 1267 Committee to freeze an individual’s [or entity’s]
assets. 54 The Security Council then conducted a review of all names on the
consolidated list and established an Office of an Ombudsperson to assist in the
considerations of delisting requests.55 In the end, however, the decision on whether
a listed entity is removed remains with the Security Council.56

MILITANTISLAMMONITOR.ORG, Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/434
(Hezbollah increased payments to family of suicide bombers from $20,000 to $100,000.).
49 President Bush’s speech, supra note 20.
50 Id.
51 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
52 See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
53 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
54 See S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) (There was an attempt to
alleviate this point of tension by requiring the State “submitting new names . . . to include identifying
information and background information.” This effort, however, only required states to adhere to the
“greatest extent possible.” In the end, individuals and entities may still be listed with limited
disclosure as to why they have been listed.). See, e.g., Kalyani Munshani, The Essence of Terrorist Finance:
An Empirical Study of the U.N. Sanctions Committee and the U.N. Consolidate List, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
229 (2010) (discussing listing procedures).
55 See S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1904, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
56 See U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the
Committee
for
the
Conduct
of
Its
Work,
July
22,
2010,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf (This Sanctions Committee is the
Committee of the Security Council which was established by Security Council Resolution 1267.).
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The exercise of authority by the Security Council in this instance is not an
abuse of power. Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the U.N. authorizes the
Security Council to implement regulations that are binding on all 192 members. 57
This article grants the Security Council the power to “decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the U.N. to apply such measures.” 58 The
Members of the U.N. are then bound by that decision and are obligated to carry it
out.59 Furthermore, if there are conflicting obligations between other international
agreements and the U.N. Charter, the obligations under the U.N. Charter prevail. 60
Although this topic has been the subject of recent litigation, 61 this comment will
assume that the legal authority hierarchy established in the U.N. Charter remains
unchanged (i.e., U.N. Resolutions trump international agreements).62
2.

U.S. as the Frontrunner: Both Willing and Able to Implement Terrorist
Financing Sanctions

Shortly after declaring war with Al Qaeda, 63 former President George W.
Bush signed an Executive Order, pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, aimed at eliminating terrorist assets. 64 Similar to S.C.
Resolution 1267, this Executive Order was designed “to disrupt the financial support
network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. government
to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities . . . as well as
their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.”65
Departing from the tactics of implementing country-wide sanctions, the U.S.
adopted a more internationally accepted strategy of targeting specific persons and
entities.66 In order to uproot these financiers of terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has over 100 employees “working full time on
[the] implementation of financial sanctions.” 67 As compared to other Western

See U.N. Charter art. 41.
Id.
59 See U.N. Charter art. 25.
60 See U.N. Charter art. 103.
61 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. V. Council &
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
62 See U.N. Charter art. 103.
63 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People
(Sep.
20,
2001),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
64 See generally, Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079; President Bush’s speech, supra note
20.
65 See Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079.
66 See John F. Cooney, Targeted Financial Sanctions, 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 9 (2009)
(Country-wide sanctions are less favorable because “innocent civilians in the targeted country would
suffer from cutting its links to international financial markets.”).
67 MAURICE R. GREENBERG, WILLIAM F. WECHSLER & LEE S. WOLOSKY, TERRORIST
FINANCING: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (2002).
57
58
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nations, OFAC has a significantly greater staff. 68 In addition to the lack of
manpower, there is a “lack of political will among U.S. allies,” which either ignore or
assign the issue a lower priority.69
The terrorism financing sanctions are close to an all-or-nothing situation.70
For this policy to be effective on the world stage, all members of the U.N. must
partake in the 1267 Resolution.71 Similar to a chain, the weakest link will cause the
strategy against terrorist financing to break down. 72 As money is fungible and
difficult to track, a gap in one country’s domestic laws will create a loophole which
financiers of terrorism will exploit.73
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has spearheaded the attack against terrorist
financiers. 74 However, future success demands international cooperation and
participation. Without a unified effort, terrorist financiers will be able to accomplish
their goals, leading to the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of innocent
people. Given the financial resources of the U.S., it certainly possesses the ability to
implement terrorist financing sanctions. More importantly, its targeted efforts to
uproot terrorist financing schemes demonstrate its willingness.
3.

Macau: Able but not Willing

Macau was returned to China on December 20, 1999 under a 1987 Joint
Declaration between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and
Portugal.75 Under this declaration, Macau operates with a high degree of autonomy
and enjoys independent powers.76 However, the country’s autonomy is limited to

68 See id. at 17. For example, “the Bank of England had a staff of about seven, the French
Ministry of Finance has two people working part-time, the German Bundesbank had one, and the
European Commission in Brussels had only one person and a half-time assistant.
69 Id. at 2.
70 See id. at 22 (2002) (Deficiencies in political will abroad – along with resulting inadequacies
in regulatory and enforcement measures – are likely to remain serious impediments to progress); see,
e.g., id. at 5 (2002) (The al-Qaeda financial network is resilient and is capable of supporting a nomadic
terrorist organization as it moves around the world.).
71 See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”).
72 See id.
73 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 223 (2002)
(“With the U.S. building its multinational coalition and deploying its troops in Afghanistan, the
Philippines, Yemen and in Georgia, Al Qaeda is responding by building a multinational alliance of
terrorist groups. Advancing the concept of the universality of the battle, it is seeking to widen the
conflict from the territorial to the global, countering U.S. initiatives by expanding its existing
alliance.”).
74 See Per Cramer, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in
the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 85, 88 (Erika de Wet
& Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
75 See Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and The
Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau, China-Port., Apr. 13, 1987,
available at http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/.
76 Id.
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matters not involving foreign policy and defense.77 In that regard, the province is
bound to the Security Council Resolutions via China’s membership.
Currently, Macau’s gaming industry generates a substantial portion of the
country’s direct taxes for public finances,78 but it is also the sector that poses the
greatest threat to terrorist financing sanctions. While a colony of Portugal, one
single private organization, the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau, held
the only government license for games and casinos, thus giving them a monopoly
over all gambling.79 This practice, however, ended in 2002 when additional licenses
were issued.80 Consequently, a flood of new casinos entered the market. 81 These
casinos are now valued at over $10 billion USD/year.82 The revenue generated by
the new casinos is a welcome addition given the Macuan’s economy’s tourism base.83
The growth and economy is not the problem the U.S. has with Macau, but rather
Macau’s threshold reporting requirement.84
Recently, Macau has been scrutinized for allowing an unreasonably high
threshold before reporting transactions.85 The international norm reporting level is
approximately $3,000, and Macau’s is $62,500. This high threshold allows large sums
of money to be potentially transferred between financiers and terrorist organizations
without question. 86 The fear of such a high threshold arrives from the gradual
evolution of terrorist financing operations. 87 For Macau, the high threshold may
allow the government to maximize tax revenues, but also makes the province a
potential site for money laundering and terrorist financing activities.88
The Macau loop-hole presents an easy target for exploitation by terrorist
financiers. One could walk up to the counter, withdraw the maximum of $62,500
and pass it on without any oversight. Two transactions of this size would be more
than enough to supply a suicide bomber with an explosive vest and provide
Id.
See The Gaming Industry, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE MSAR,
http://www.gcs.gov.mo/files/factsheet/Gaming_EN.pdf (In 2009, the gaming industry contributed
$5.71 billion in direct taxes. This amounted to 65% of Macao’s total public finances.).
79 Angela Veng Mei Leong, Macau Casinos and Organised Crime, 74 J. MONEY LAUNDERING
298, 300 (2004).
80 Id.
81
See The Gaming Industry, supra note 78 (The MSAR government signed concession
agreements with Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Casino Company. The
government then allowed sub-concessions which brought in the Venetian Group, MGM Grand
Paradise, and Melco PBL Gaming.).
82 See Mary-Anne Toy, A bet bigger than Vegas, THE AGE (MELBOURNE), Apr. 1, 2006, at 3.
83 See The Gaming Industry, supra note 78 (gaming industry accounts for 65% of Macao’s total
public finances).
84 See John Carney, Macau in US Cross Hairs Over Terror Financing, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 15, 2010.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“Counter-terror experts say some groups have
simply switched to using more cash, slipping across borders undetected. Authorities say they
recognise the changing money flows, but cutting them off is no simple matter, particularly in cashbased economies with loose border controls.”).
88 See Carney, supra note 84.
77
78
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compensation to his/her family.89 The problem is not that Macau cannot lower the
threshold, but rather that it chooses not to. Macau’s concern is that reducing the cap
from $62,500 to $3,000 would impede high-rollers from gambling, which,
consequently, would interfere with the Macauan government’s most significant
source of revenue.90 However, with an economy deeply rooted in the tourism and
gambling industries, the Macauan economy is extremely vulnerable to terrorist
attacks.91 Macau has the financial ability to implement terrorist financing sanctions,
but is unwilling to do so.
4.

Tanzania: Willing but Not Able

The situation in Tanzania exhibits a different set of problems to the
implementation of international terrorist finance sanctions. Unlike Macau, the
Tanzanian government does not have the financial resources available nor is it a
priority to implement terrorist financing measures due to financial constraints. 92
Terrorist organizations in Tanzania and East Africa “[have] concentrated most of the
financial activities in informal sectors long before 2001.”93 Therefore, “[by] the time
the U.S. government began its international drive . . . to develop an international
counter-terrorism finance regime . . . , [these] terrorist finance networks . . . had
already achieved some insulation.”94
The more fundamental problems lie in the country’s lack of ability95 and lack
of priority96 to tackle terrorist financing. Despite enacting measures in furtherance of
the terrorist financing sanctions,97 “law enforcement agencies and political agents . . .
are widely considered among the most corrupt elements of society, [thus]
undermining their credibility to combat terrorism.”98 Furthermore, even if it were to
be stipulated that Tanzania had a stable and trustworthy government, there are more
pressing concerns that demand the local government’s attention before it is able to
effectively combat terrorism.99 Several of these concerns pertain to the humanitarian
and economic crises that plague the State.100
89 See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 44 (putting cost of suicide attack at approximately $150);
Palestinians get Saddam Funds, supra note 48; Hizbollah increases pay, supra note 48.
90 JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 3
(2nd ed. 2010).
91 See ROSS C. DEVOL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON U.S. METROPOLITAN
ECONOMIES 5 (Jan. 2002).
92
See, e.g., Jessica Piombo, Terrorist Financing and Government Response in East Africa, in
TERRORIST FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 185, 186 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas
eds., 2007) (Other issues need to addressed first, such as border security, smuggling, arms transfers,
and human trafficking. From these measures, it would indirectly fight terrorist financing but also
extend beyond the threat of terrorism.).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 197.
96 Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, & Pasquale Vittori, Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat
in the War on Terror?, 32 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1075 (2009).
97 See Piombo, supra note 92, at 197 (noting Tanzania has criminalized terrorist financing).
98 Id. at 199.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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The international dilemma is getting Tanzania, a country unable to effectively
seek out terrorist financiers, to allocate sufficient resources to an “unimportant”
domestic cause. 101 To the Tanzanian government, this feat would be nearly
impossible for several reasons. First, a strike at terrorist financing may be a strike at
the foundation of their political power.102 Ironically, if the Tanzanian government
officials were to implement and enforce the suggested measures, it may erode a base
of their financial income.103 With part of the government rooted in corruption and
terrorism, politicians will be hesitant to pursue measures that lead to their demise.
Secondly, “there simply are no substitutes in these cash-based economies.”104
Supposing that the Tanzanian government would then pursue sanctions on the
informal banking systems, they would meet “sharp resistance . . . , potentially leading
to political upheaval.”105
Unlike the situation in Macau, Tanzania does not have the capabilities to
implement effective enforcement measures to combat terrorist financing. 106
Interestingly, the situation in Tanzania mirrors the former situation in Iraq, where
one of the most effective counter-terrorism tactics was support for the development
of a democratically elected government.107 For Tanzania, a government riddled with
corruption and gapping flaws, the only realistic method for reform requires thirdparty intervention to reset and recalibrate the political infrastructure.108 Tanzania, by
and through its people, would be more than willing to implement these terrorist
financing measures. These measures will bring stability to the government and its
people. Without sufficient financial resources, Tanzania will be unable to implement
effective counter-terrorism financing sanctions, despite its willingness to do so.109
A comparative examination of the counterterrorism financing regimes in the
U.S., Macau, and Tanzania illustrates the need for a coordinated international effort.
Depending on the political and economic climate, a state’s ability to allocate
resources to terrorist financing regulation varies. Independent from this ability is a
state’s willingness to actually pursue these measures. As the following sections will
show, there is a possible solution to eliminate the gaps in terrorist financing
sanctions.

Id.
Piombo, supra note 92, at 200.
103 Id. at 201.
By providing money laundering services, individuals involved receive
payments for their assistance.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., id. at 186 (Other issues are of greater importance to the Tanzanian government
than terrorist financing sanctions.).
107 See Piombo, supra note 92, at 202.
108 See, e.g., id.
109 Financial resources may be derived from the domestic state or from a foreign source.
For example, military aid provided by a third-party is a financial resource. This military aid provides
the domestic country with a resource which costs nothing to that country.
101
102
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II. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE “WILLINGNESS TO BUY” THEORY TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCING SANCTIONS
Politics, filled with complex nuances, revolve around give and take. A more
simplistic and practical approach would be to apply economics; specifically,
behavioral economics. This allows one to understand the decision making processes
of a country. This phenomenon explains how a country should react under certain
stimuli. Based upon reactions, countries can be classified into one of four categories.
The dynamic relationship between these categories will allow the creation of an
effective solution.
A. Willingness Versus Ability
To show the inadequacy of the current Security Council resolutions with
regard to terrorist financing, one must understand the distinction between a state’s
willingness and ability to implement these measures. Understanding how a state
behaves in light of certain factors will allow the international community to tailor an
effective solution.
The “willingness to buy” theory, created by George Katona in 1960, was first
used to analyze individual consumer behaviors, but it may also be applied to
countries when they are viewed as individual actors.110 By applying this theory to
states, in regard to terrorist financing sanctions, the theory explains why a state
chooses to participate (or not to participate).
The “willingness to buy” theory elaborates on the classical economic
model.
The classical model ties one’s consumption directly to its income and
ability to buy.112 The “willingness to buy” theory, however, holds that there may be
“fluctuations in willingness to buy, independent of fluctuations in ability to buy, and
that they, too, influence demand.”113 For example, an individual receives additional
income, which enables her to make more purchases; however, she refrains from
making the purchase because of the ongoing economic depression.114
111

When an individual acquires income, there are two ways in which the
consumer may dispose of his or her income: spend or save.115 Depending on that
person’s propensity to consume and propensity to save, the income would be
divided accordingly.116 From the money allocated to spending, consumers typically
See Section II.B. infra p. 15.
See GEORGE KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER 5 (1960).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 25.
114 Id. at 17.
115 Id. at 14.
116
See
Propensity
to
Consume
Definition,
Britannica.com,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/478975/propensity-to-consume (last visited Apr. 16,
2012);
see
also
Propensity
to
Save
Definition,
Britannica.com,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/478976/propensity-to-save (last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
110
111
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purchase their necessities before purchasing luxury goods.117 Subsequent purchases
for non-necessities are categorized as discretionary purchases.118
Both the classical economic model and the “willingness to buy” theory have
the same starting point. The analysis begins with the determination of the
consumer’s demand, which is the conditions (income, assets, and debts) that grant a
consumer the ability to buy. 119 A portion of the consumer’s income would be
siphoned into savings, while the rest would be allocated towards spending.120 Under
both theories, the consumer would first purchase their necessary goods;121 however,
classical economics states that discretionary purchases (purchases other than
necessities) are determined by the remaining availability of income.122
Unlike classical economics, the “willingness to buy” theory refines
discretionary expenditures by adding a subjective component.123 As the consumer
already has the ability to buy (because discretionary expenditures, by their very
nature, are made from the excess of spending income after necessary purchases have
been made), the question then falls on whether the consumer would be willing to
make this purchase. 124 The answer lies in the subjective expectations of the
consumer.125 In times of economic prosperity and worldwide euphoria, a consumer
will spend the additional income that he/she has acquired.126 Conversely, when the
consumer is pessimistic or has an insecure outlook on life, the consumer is less likely
to spend despite having additional income.127
This theory can be seen in consumer behavior between World War II and
the years after its end. During the war, consumers were not forced to save, yet the
American people “accumulated approximately $100 billion worth of savings.” 128
After the war ended, economists believed that an economic crisis would occur as
soldiers would be demobilized, orders for military equipment would be cancelled,
and millions of people would be laid off.129 Despite all of those factors, there was no
economic crisis. When war turned to peace, consumers expressed a strong desire to
spend more and save less in spite of economic reconversion.130 While the post-war
KATONA, supra note 111, at 14.
Cristina Poncibo, Some Thoughts on the Methodological Approach to EC Consumer Law Reform,
21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 353, 362 (2009).
119 KATONA, supra note 111, at 6.
120 See Propensity to Consume, supra note 116; see also Propensity to Save, supra note 116
(When a consumer receives income, it may only be spent or saved. By adding the amount spent to
the amount saved, you get the consumer’s income.).
121 KATONA, supra note 111, at 14.
122 Suppose a consumer makes $100 and decides to save 10%, which is $10. Of the
remaining $90, she spends $50 on necessary goods. Classical economics would hold that the $40 left
over would be spent on discretionary expenditures. See id. at 26.
123 Id. at 25.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See KATONA, supra note 111, at 25.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 32.
129 Id. at 31.
130 Id. at 32.
117
118
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economy was in a worse economic position, spending increased due to consumer’s
belief of prosperous futures.131
The implications of this theory may be applied to the issue of international
terrorist financing. By understanding the spending habits of individual countries, a
more effective solution may be formed which would increase participation in
creating and maintaining international security.
B. Applying the “Willingness to Buy” Theory to International Actors
In order for international states to fall within the “willingness to buy” theory,
several factors must be explained so that there are no large incompatibilities between
an individual’s consumption and the state’s consumption. As individuals are utilitymaximizers, in that they spend their income on goods that would increase their
utility, states operate in a similar fashion. 132 While individuals seek to maximize
happiness, states seek to maximize security.133 Therefore, countries have an incentive
to implement and enforce sanctions against terrorist financing.134
Even if a state adamantly opposes the enforcement of these sanctions,
arguing that international security has no benefit whatsoever to the host country,
their decision to join the U.N. will impute a derived benefit from greater
international security. 135 Despite arguments that international security bears no
benefit, direct or indirect, to the host country or that the country’s decision to join
was purely political, this comment maintains that a substantial underlying reason for
participation in the U.N. revolves around the concept of international security.136
However, unlike individual goods, international security is a public good,
subject to the “free rider” effect.137 Public goods are “nonrivalrous,” meaning that
the consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce the availability of
the good for consumption by others. 138 Public goods are also “non-excludable,”
meaning that no one can effectively be excluded from using the good. 139 The
problem with the “good” of international security is that states enjoy the benefits the
good creates but are reluctant to contribute to the system that created those
benefits.140 Therefore, under the “willingness to buy” theory, able states are willing
to buy, but they choose not to in hope that they are able to “free ride” the benefits.141
See KATONA, supra note 111, at 32.
See ROBERT B. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (6th ed. 2011).
133 See id.
134 Id. at 12-13.
135 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (“The Purpose[] of the United Nations [is] . . . to maintain
international peace and security.”).
136 See, e.g., id.
137 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41 (“They hope to benefit at no cost to
themselves from the payment of others.”).
138 Id. at 40.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 41.
141 See id. A common example is national defense. A consumer may be able to increase the
defense of the nation, but it comes at the risk of injury/death. However, if the consumer decides to
131
132
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Next, in looking at a state’s ability to pay, the conditions that grant a state the
ability to buy are the same as the conditions that grant an individual consumer the
ability to buy. The state derives income from taxing individuals and businesses. 142
But unlike individuals who purchase goods, the government provides services to its
citizens. From the tax revenue, the government has the option of saving a portion
for rainy days or spending it on the people. 143 Of the portion allocated towards
spending, it would be divided between necessary services or discretionary services.144
Necessary services are services which are absolutely necessary to create or
maintain a fully functional government.145 The most widespread example is national
defense which the government funds through compulsory taxation.146 Discretionary
services would be those that are not fundamental to the role of the government, like
healthcare, social security, etc.147 Enforcement of terrorist financing sanctions falls
under the latter.
Similar to an individual’s willingness to buy, a state’s willingness to buy is
grounded in the state’s subjective expectations based on past events, current
situation, and future outlook. 148 Here, it would turn on the state’s geographic
location, past history with terrorist encounters, current investment in the fight
against terrorist financing, political climate, and expectation of other state’s
involvement.
Consequently, states will first allocate their resources toward the creation and
maintenance of a stable government. Only then will these states consider the
implementation of international terrorist financing sanctions. 149 As previously
mentioned, the problem with the benefits that these sanctions produce is that it is a
public good.150 With receipt of benefits without payment of resources, some states
will de-prioritize their investments for terrorist financing sanctions.
While a state is by no means an individual consumer, states may behave as
such in their decision-making process. When a state bases its expenditures on both
its ability and willingness to pay, it allows the international regulatory body of the
U.N. to carefully tailor mandates and sanctions in order to maximize participation.

not contribute to the nation’s defense, there is no possible way to exclude the consumer from this
benefit.
142 MILLER & MAINE, supra note 90 at 3.
143 See, e.g., Propensity to Consume, supra note 116; Propensity to Save, supra note 116.
144 KATONA, supra note 111, at 15.
145 See id. at 15 (Expenditures on necessities for the government arises from their obligation
to provide the required services to the general population).
146 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41.
147 See KATONA, supra note 111, at 16-17 (These discretionary expenditures “are not
inevitably necessary, not habitual, and not made on the spur of the moment.”).
148 See id. at 26.
149 See id. at 14-15 (Terrorist financing sanctions are discretionary expenditures which would
be invested in so long as the necessary obligations have been met.).
150 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41.
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C. How Terrorist Financing Sanctions Fall Within the “Willingness to Buy” Theory
When we turn to the specific enforcement of international terrorist financing
sanctions, there are four categories under which a country may fall: (1) willing and
able, (2) able but unwilling, (3) willing but unable, and (4) unwilling and unable. The
importance of sorting countries into the correct category is that it allows the U.N. to
better draft specific measures to induce compliance. More specifically, the key
objective is to persuade countries in categories 2 and 3 to implement enforcement
measures against terrorist financing.
Category 1: Willing and Able. Category 1 countries, such as the U.S., do not
require extra attention from the U.N. For example, the U.S. has already
demonstrated that it is both willing and able to implement sanctions against terrorist
financing sanctions.151 Therefore, no additional attention is required to increase or
maintain their participation.152
Category 2: Able, but Unwilling. Countries category 2 may be subdivided by the
reason for why these countries are able, yet unwilling. The first subdivision would be
countries that refuse on political and religious grounds. Countries, like Iran and
Syria, which are state-sponsors of terrorism and likely will never agree to the
implementation of terrorist financing sanction measures. Furthermore, these
countries may even argue that these “terrorists” are freedom-fighters and fall outside
the scope of the targeted group.153
The second subdivision consists of countries that have neglected to
implement terrorist sanctions due to the negative economic impact that may result.
These countries are fully able to spare financial resources in furtherance of the
international effort to stop or hinder terrorist financiers.154 As seen with Macau, the
downside to compliance with international measures is the possible negative impact
borne by the game and casino industry. For Macau, abiding by the sanctions regime
may possibly decrease revenue streams from the gaming industry. However, these
sanctions are necessary in order to preserve the state’s economy.155
As economic growth and success depends on continuing international
security, most category 2 countries and/or provinces like Macau are willing to
enforce terrorist financing sanctions. However, the allure of receiving all the benefits
without having to put in the work tempts these countries to sit back and let category
See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
See id. (The U.S. has already enacted and implemented terrorist financing sanctions, so
there is no need for additional incentives.).
153 See Section III.A. infra p. 19.
154 See Macau Section I.B.3. supra p. 9.
155 Terrorist attacks in the United States devastated the country’s economy. Not even Las
Vegas was insulated from the fallout. See, e.g., Gambling Revenue Fell 6.9% in April, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2003, at C2 (As a result of the war with Iraq and the state of the economy, travel to Las Vegas
decreased.); DEVOL, supra note 91, at 5; and Attacks May Cost U.S. 1.8 Million Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, at A16 (“The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks will cost the nation more than 1.8 million jobs by the end
of the year.”).
151
152
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1 countries do all the work.156 Unbeknownst to those in category 2, the success of
the War on Terror turns heavily on a unified international effort.157
Category 3: Unwilling, but Able. As earlier mentioned the application of the
“willingness to buy” theory begins with the determination of the state’s ability to
buy. 158 A problem arises when this cannot be established. 159 However, unlike
individual consumers whose future actions are not bound by their association to a
group, members in the U.N. have, in essence, pledged their willingness to promote
international security through their participation within the U.N. itself.160 So in the
context of countries within the U.N., it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that a
state is unable yet willing.161
When we are presented with a category 3 state, the problem arises from the
inability of the state to expend their precious resources on discretionary expenditures
when they are not even able to supply the basic services of a functional government.
A “free rider” effect takes place as these countries enjoy the fruits of other states’
labor. 162 However, unlike category 2 countries, the predicament cannot be
ameliorated by the same inducements.
Tanzania, for example, has both an unstable government and terrorist
organizations residing within its borders.163 The government is filled with corrupt
politicians and, as a result, these terrorist financing measures are left unenforced. 164
If the U.N. were to force Tanzania, by any means necessary, to implement and
enforce terrorist financing sanctions, it would create more problems than it would
solve. 165 Terrorist organizations thrive on ineffective government and this forced
diversion from necessary services to discretionary services would bolster terrorism in
Tanzania.166 While a unified international effort is required to successfully inhibit the
financing of terrorism, one-hundred percent cooperation may be an unnecessary evil
in this case.

See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41.
See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”).
158 KATONA, supra note 111, at 25.
159 Id. at 3-4 (The “willingness to buy” theory requires the consumer to first have the ability
to buy, then the second part is to analyze whether the consumer would be willing to make the
purchase.).
160 U.N. Charter art. 103.
161 See id.
162 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41.
163 See Piombo, supra note 92, at 202.
164 See id. at 200-01 (Effective implementation of terrorist financing sanctions will only affect
the politician’s political survival. So even though these measures have been enacted, they have yet to
be enforced.).
165 See, e.g., id. at 201 (The Tanzanian government would face mass protests if it tried to
crack down on terrorist finance routes); id. at 186 (More pressing matters that concerns the Tanzanian
government include effective border security, control of illicit activities, and human trafficking).
166 See, e.g., id. at 202 (Combating terrorism in Tanzania requires police and security forces.
By implementing financing sanctions, nothing would be done to solve the underlying problem.).
156
157
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Category 4: Neither Willing nor Able. Category 4 countries are both unable and
unwilling to implement terrorist financing sanctions. Again, this category may be
broken down into two subdivisions. One group is developing countries that are
supported by Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism. The other category is
developing countries that have not yet joined the U.N. This group, however, is
extremely small.167 There is no possible way for the U.N. or its regulatory bodies to
extend sanctions beyond their jurisdiction. In lieu of the abundance of benefits a
state derives from participation with the U.N., these countries will be granted full
free-riding privilege.
III. FOUR-STEP SOLUTION
Much attention has been paid to the quality of the procedures through which
organizations, entities, and even individuals are targeted. Some argue that too much
discretion is left in the hands of government with no supervisory oversight. 168
Others claim that a more effective answer to the harsh treatment of sanctions is to
create an intermediate level between no sanctions and sanctions.169 This comment
does not address the fairness question presented when a target has been listed and
subjected to sanctions. Rather, this comment seeks to examine a separate flaw in the
system - the lack of international implementation and enforcement of terrorist
financing sanctions. In addition, this comment proposes a four-step solution
designed to eliminate terrorist financing networks and bring devastating terrorist
attacks to a halt.
A. Defining “Terrorism”
Before implementing any specific enforcement mechanism, the parameters in
which the body operates must be defined. More specifically, “terrorism” needs an
international definition.170
One of the biggest threats of terrorism is the lack of consensus on “how to
define [international] terrorism.” 171 While the international agreement may be
difficult, the U.S., shockingly, has nineteen different definitions of terrorism in

See UN welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 14, 2011),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39034&Cr=South+Sudan&Cr1=
(The United Nations currently has 193 Member States.); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Independent
States of the World (July 29, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (The U.S.
Department of State currently recognizes 195 independent states in the world.).
168 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, Warsaw, 16.V.2005.
169 See generally Robert E. O’Leary, Improving the Terrorist Finance Sanctions Process, 42 N.Y.U.
INT’L L. & POL. 549 (2010).
170 See, e.g., There is no UN Definition for Terrorism, supra note 9.
171 Craig S. Smith, Debate Over Iraq Raises Fears of a Shrinking Role for NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2003 (quoting Celeste A. Wallander, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies).
167
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federal law. 172 With so many conflicting definitions, the prerequisite requirement
lacks clarity.
The discrepancy arises through the manner in which terrorism is defined.
Generally, “[t]errorism is defined variously by the perpetrators’ motives, methods,
targets, and victims.”173 For example, the U.N. attempted to distinguish between
“terrorists” and “freedom fighters,” in which acts of violence in pursuit of selfdetermination do not constitute terrorism. 174 The approach, however, may
“legitimate as non-terrorist certain groups nearly universally recognized as terrorist,
including . . . Hezbollah, and Hamas.”175
Others have found it more suitable to define terrorism solely by the method
of violence. 176 For instance, the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism prescribes certain offenses, such as the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, or
automatic firearm that endanger persons, as terrorist acts.177 In doing so, it explicitly
removes the actor’s political judgment by defining most violent acts as not
political.178 This approach, however, leaves evil minded people with the opportunity
to avoid terrorist liability by tailoring their methods outside of the statute’s scope.179
Another approach to the definition of terrorism is to “focus on the victims
of the attacks or the relationship between the perpetrators and the victims.”180 The
victims are selected as the target of violence and exist in a state of chronic fear. 181
They are immobilized and become disoriented and/or compliant.182 The impact of

172 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5)
(2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (1996);
18 U.S.C.A. § 1992 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22) (2006); 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2010); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004); 22 U.S.C. § 2708(k)(1) (2008); Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2(15), 116 Stat. 2135, 2141 (2002); id. at 2242; Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323-24 (2002); 49
U.S.C.A. § 44703(g)(3) (2010); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(1),
110 Stat. 1541, 1549 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13224, § 3, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080; 28 C.F.R. §
0.85(1) (2003).
173 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 n. 42 (2d Cir. 2003). But see Arab Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, IOR 51/001/2002 (Terrorism is defined, but it is
only deemed a terrorist attack if it committed against the Arab states; otherwise, it is not an act of
terrorism.).
174 See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 21 (Oct. 24, 1971).
175 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 107 n. 42.
176 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, 1137 U.N.T.S.
93.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 107 n. 42.
180 Id.
181 ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM 1-2 (1988).
182 Id. at 2.
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the violence, however, extends beyond the victims to the audience.183 This causes
the audience to change their behavior to favor the terrorists’ interest.184
The problem should be obvious: how to fight terrorism when there is no
universal definition? Applying the abstraction of Coase Theorem would help answer
this question. This theorem states that “[w]hen transactions costs 185 are zero, an
efficient use of resources results from private bargaining, regardless of the legal
assignment of . . . rights.”186 In the alternative, “[w]hen transaction costs are high
enough to prevent bargaining, the efficient use of resources will depend on how . . .
rights are assigned.”187 The U.N. consists of 192 members,188 many of whom offer
different definitions of “terrorism.” If it is left to U.N. member states to create a
definition, the cost of bargaining will be insurmountable. 189 The U.N. needs to
create a reasonable definition for “terrorism” that is binding on all member states. 190
The definition itself is not as important as the clear-cut standard it creates. It
provides notice of which actions are “terrorist” acts and which are not.191
B. Create a U.N. Committee to Determine the States’ Category
Once a workable definition of terrorism is agreed upon, the second step
requires the U.N. to create a committee (similar to the 1267 Committee) with the
authority to place members into the three possible categories.192
With a set definition in place, this committee would categorize each state.
Countries fully partaking in the sanctioning effort (both willing and able) will fall
under Category 1. These states would not be sanctioned; rather, the committee
would bestow special privileges onto them.193
Id.
Id.
185
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 85 (“‘transaction costs’ [encompasses] all
impediments to bargaining.” So the vast amount of States with an interest in the definition of
“terrorism” would constitute as an impediment.).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 United Nations Member States, supra note 167.
189 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 88 (“Bargaining becomes more costly and
difficult as it involves more parties.”).
190 This comment makes no effort to present a method in which this definition may be
ascertained. It asserts the end conclusion that one must be established to aid the fight against
terrorism. See, e.g., H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition, 26 CHITTY'S L.J.
105 (1978) (“The problem of the definition of terrorism is more than semantic. It is really a cloak for
a complexity of problems, psychological, political, legalistic, and practical.”); Michael P.
Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence between
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 391 (2001)
(“The problem of defining ‘terrorism’ has vexed the international community for years.”).
191 The definition should not be set in stone and should be open to amendments and
modification. Also, it should include a residual clause to allow new innovative tactics to fall within its
categorization.
192 While there are four possible categories of willingness and ability, Category 4 is not an
option. It is assumed that when a county joins the United Nations, they agree to be bound by the
U.N. Charter. Therefore, all states must be “willing.” See Section II.C.4. supra p. 19.
193 See Section III.C. infra p. 22.
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Category 2 (unwilling, but able) and Category 3 (unable, but willing) states
will be determined by analyzing their economic status. The spectrum will range from
developed to undeveloped (or poor to rich). States determined to be developed will
fall under Category 2; whereas those that are not will fall under Category 3. The duty
of this committee is purely administrative with no enforcement mechanism. It has
one simple task: determine the applicable category for each state.
C. Grant Regulatory Authority to Category 1 States over Category 2 and Category 3 States
Rather than have the U.N. create an enforcement mechanism, this authority
will be delegated to states that are both willing and able (Category 1). This solution
will allow Category 1 states to regulate terrorist financing sanctions of non-compliant
states (Category 2 & 3). By expanding the authority of compliant countries, it
addresses the enforcement gap within the international scheme.
For the compliant states, this is a double-edged sword. The material benefit
here is that Category 1 states have the opportunity to usurp limited control over the
affairs of a non-compliant state. But at the same time, the additional exercise of
authority imposes a financial burden. For some, this may be an opportunity for
Category 1 states to enhance its influence on the international stage. For others, like
the U.S., it would be an opportunity to fix a broken system. With compliant states
picking up the slack, it is more difficult for terrorist organizations to find and exploit
the weak links.194
To noncompliant states, the message is clear: implement effective terrorist
financing sanctions or have someone else do it for you. Category 2 states will
internalize this threat on their autonomy and respond accordingly. 195 However,
Category 3 states have no choice but to have a third-party intervene in their affairs.
To some, it is a blessing.196 To others, like Tanzania, which are rooted in corruption,
third-party intervention will corrode their political power.197
The authority bestowed upon Category 1 states will make several impacts.
Here, Category 2 states will immediately implement effective terrorist financing
sanctions for fear of losing a portion of their sovereignty. Because these states are
able to implement terrorist financing sanctions, the balancing of sovereignty with
increased financial burden will usually fall in favor of sovereignty. Once these
sanctions have been enacted, the committee (created in the previous section) will
routinely review the states within each category. Therefore, Category 2 states may be
See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63.
Category 2 states have the ability to provide for effective terrorist financing sanctions;
however, they choose not to as it run against one of their interests. The threat to autonomy should
make Category 2 states very willing to comply. See Category 2 Section II.C.2. supra p. 17.
196 Category 3 states do not have the ability to provide for effective terrorist financing
sanctions. First, these states must provide the necessary services to its citizens, but until it can do
that, its discretionary expenditures (i.e. funds for terrorist financing sanctions) are limited. See
Category 3 in Section II.C.3. supra p. 18.
197 See, e.g., Piombo, supra note 92, at 201.
194
195
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re-categorized as Category 1 states when committee deems this state to have
demonstrated its willingness and ability.
The other impact comes from the sharpened focus of Category 1 states on
developing and implementing terrorist financing sanctions in Category 3 states. This
will lessen the burden of each Category 1 state. Category 3 states will then receive
the benefit of discretionary services without having the ability to provide for it.
In the end, this solution will guarantee an international effort against terrorist
financing. Category 2 will become empty as the threat of decreased autonomy forces
compliance. All that would remain are Category 1 & 3 with Category 1 states filling
in where Category 3 states cannot.
D. Reduce the Involvement of the U.S. in Pursuing Terrorist Financiers
One of the biggest impediments to international involvement stems from the
U.S.’s investment in the terrorist financing sanctions. With the U.S. taking such a
dominant role, other countries feel no pressure to implement these sanctions for
their safety. However, by initially expanding the possible scope of U.S. jurisdiction,
it forces many other countries to enact effective sanctions. 198 With others
participating in fighting terrorist financiers, the U.S.’s role will lessen.
International security is a free-ride good, meaning that all countries benefit
from increased international security regardless of whether that country has invested
in the effort.199 It is also non-excludable.200 The U.S. would be unable to limit the
benefits of their terrorist financing sanctions to only themselves and other
participating countries.201 Therefore, countries like Tanzania will reap the benefits
despite being unable to pay into the system.202 Also, countries/provinces like Macau
will also be able to enjoy the benefits even if they do not want to participate.203
Once other states implement effective terrorist financing measures, the U.S.
will be able to reduce its role. Also, because an international effort is in place, the
lessened U.S. role will not bear negative consequences. If the U.S. were to limit its
effort prior to the establishment of an international effort, the threat of terrorism
would potentially increase. But, by decreasing its effort after, this issue is averted.
By decreasing the U.S.’s role, the goal is to integrate other states into the
regulatory scheme. If a state believes its contribution has gone unnoticed, hidden in
the shadow of the U.S., it will be hesitant to continue to contribute. By
simultaneously removing the U.S. from the pedestal and increasing the participation

198
199
200
201
202
203

See Section III.C. supra p. 22.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 118, at 41.
See id. at 40.
See id.
See Tanzania Section I.B.4. supra p. 11.
See Macau Section I.B.3. supra p. 9.
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of other actors, the importance of an international commitment to the fight against
terrorist financing will be solidified.
The weakness here is that the U.S. has been and continues to be a key target
of terrorist attacks.204 Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been leading the charge
with regards to terrorist financing sanctions.205 Having been attacked by terrorist
organizations, the U.S. greatly values international security.206 Therefore, an increase
in international participation will not alter the U.S.’s level of regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Terrorism and the havoc it wreaks are real. These attacks affect people in
every corner of the world. From the rich to the poor, the concussive effect of
terrorism knows no boundaries. While the U.S. was the primary target of the 9/11
attacks, the impact left the entire world in disarray.207
Terrorist attacks, however, can be prevented and/or mitigated. There are
substantial financial resources that go into the execution of each terrorist attack.208
By eliminating financial support to terrorist organizations, their policies and
methodologies will drastically change.209 The lives of innocent victims will be spared.
No longer will civilians have to live in fear of uncertain death.
Theoretically, terrorist financing sanctions seem trivial and obvious. The
issue lies in the implementation and enforcement of these sanctions. Similar to a
colander, anything short of a unified international effort to block each loop-hole,
financial resources will be diverted, but still flow through to terrorist organizations.210
Every state needs to cooperate in order to effectively sever the ties between terrorist
financiers and terrorist organizations.211
The problem arises when countries cannot or choose not to pay into the
international system. In the current state of affairs, terrorist financiers can move and
launder money with ease. 212 A solution needs to be introduced which holds all
countries to the U.N. Charter.213 By usurping a portion of a nation’s sovereignty, this
204
See, e.g., The Terrorist Attack Cycle: Selecting the Target, STRATFOR GLOBAL
INTELLIGENCE, Sept. 30, 2005 (Terrorists will choose their targets carefully. “They prefer to generate
a [high] number of casualties and generate more media attention.”).
205 See Cramer, supra note 74 at 88.
206 After the 9/11 attacks, the dangers of terrorist attacks became a reality. The fact
Americans were attacked on their own soil instills fear, which will affect one’s valuation of
goods/services. See, e.g., KATONA, supra note 111, at 26.
207 Floyd Norris & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Stocks Tumble Abroad; Exchanges in New York Never
Opened for the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001.
208 See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 44; Palestinians get Saddam Funds, supra note 48; Hizbollah
increases pay, supra note 48.
209 See Frisch, supra note 3, at 1052.
210 See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63.
211 See id.
212 See Basile, supra note 22, at 171; see also Hezbollah around the World, supra note 22.
213 See U.N. Charter art. 41.
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will ensure that all countries that are able to implement terrorist financing sanctions
do so.214 This will bear two effects: (1) all countries that are able to implement these
sanctions will exploit the opportunity to expand their sovereignty; and (2) only
countries that are unable will remain subject to third-party regulations.
In the end, this will maximize the number of participants in the fight against
terrorist financiers. Terrorist organizations will starve and dissolve. The fight
against terrorism will take a turn for the best. While international terrorist financing
sanctions cannot prevent all acts of terrorisms, these sanctions will reduce the
frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks.
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